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System.UNIONISM AND THE CYCLICAL BEHAVIOR OF THE
LABOR MARKET IN U.S. MANUFACTURING
Ouri ng the 1970's, evidence from contractions in economic activ-
ity and theoretical developments in business cycle analysis stimulated
renewed interest in the cycl ical behavior of the 1abor market. Consi der-
able research was, and continues to be, devoted to the explanation of why
movements in aggregate demand produce large fluctuations in employment and
1ittle or no change in nominal wage growth. The pattern exhibited in the
1973-1975 recession is an example of this phenomenon. Nomi nal wages
continued to rise at a 6-8 percent annual rate while unemployment increased
from 4.9 to 9.1 percent.
Most cyclical variation in employment arises from shifts in the
demand for 1abor in the goods-producing sector of the economy, where about
half the production workers belong to labor unions. Unionism has long been
regarded as a source of wage rigidity,y so an examination of its respon-
sibility for the pattern of sticky wages and variable employment is worth
pursuing. Thi s paper i nvestigates the differences in the responses to
cyclical shifts in demand by employers of union and nonunion labor. The
empirical analysis covers the adjustments in the wage rates, weekly hours
worked, and employment of production workers in manufacturing during the
1973-1975 recession. Cross section analysis of the effect of industry
demand conditions on industry wage levels provides information on wage
flexibility not obtainable from the usual time series methods. A compari-
son of the effect of the demand variable on the wages of union and nonunion2
workers tests the union wage rigidity hypothesis. The comparison of
adjustments in hours and employment in the two environments proceeds along
similar lines.
The question of how unionism affects a firm's response to demand
variation falls within the domain of the recent theoretical work on the
importance of contracting in explaining cyclical employment fluctuations.
Traditional analysis views the setting of nominal wages in long term
contracts as an important element in the explanation of why nominal shocks
produce real effects. The presumed greater rigidity in the union wage
should produce more cyclical variation in the employment of union members
than in the employment of similar nonunion workers. Modern models of
efficient contracting, which emphasize the durability of the typical
employer-employee relationship, imply that employment and wages can vary
independently over the life of this relationship. Thus, wage rigidity may
be irrelevant to the cyclical variation in unemployment. (See the
interchange between Fischer and Barro.)
The recent work has also produced some insights into possible
contributors to the stickiness in wage rates. Wage inflexibility in models
of efficient contracting is a consequence of infrequent job changes
combined with workers' desires for stable incomes. Other analysts have
concluded that adjustment costs will also cause wages to respond to shocks
more slowly in 1abor markets in whi ch turnover is low (Wi 11 i amson and
Wachter). These theories appear to be designed to explain the behavior of
the labor market in manufacturing, which exhibits the low separation rates
and frequent large shifts in demand stressed in this literature.3
Thus, the recent theoretical work has raised the possibility that
(1) unionism may not be a primary source of wage rigidity; and
(2) the magnitude of cyclical employment variation may be
independent of the response of wages to cyclical shocks.
Because these are important propositions, further di scussion of the recent
1iterature of contracting and its implications for the effects of unionism
precedes the description of the empi rical work. Thi s di scussion is brief,
for its purpose is merely to provide a pair of alternate frameworks that
will be useful in interpreting the results.
Preliminary i nspection of the data suggests that uni on members
did indeed have more rigid wages and more variable employment between 1973
and 1975. The union-nonunion wage differential rose 3 percentage points,
and the percentage of union employees working overtime declined twice as
much as the percentage of nonuni on employees worki ng more than usual. In
f4ay of 1975, layoff unemployment was more than 2 percentage points higher
among union workers than among nonunion workers. The more detailed
analysis, which controls for differences in employment changes across
industries, indicates the cycl ical responses of wages and hours differ
sharply in the union and nonunion sectors. Smaller, but still significant,
differences are found in employment adjustments.
In view of the large difference in the responses of union and
nonunion wages, the similarity of the employment adjustments in the two
environments is interesting. The result has a number of possible causes.
First, the union and nonunion sectors are not independent of one another,
so a dec1ine in produetion from uni on pl ants could cause a drop in demand
or a shortage of material in nonuni on pl ants. Second, the hourly wage is
not the only form of compensation, and union employers may make larger4
adjustments in fringe benefits than nonunion employers. Third, this may be
an indication that wage and employment variation are indeed independent.
Overall, the evidence indicates that unions matter, but the process through
which collective bargaining influences wage, employment, and hours
adjustments is not fully revealed.
I. Theoretical framework
A. Labor contracting in manufacturing
The principal feature that distinguishes contract markets from
auction markets is the durable association between trading partners. In
labor market analysis, hiring and training costs (Secker; Oi) and opportun-
ities to redistribute the risk arising from future shifts in market condi-
tions (Gordon; Baily (1974); Azariadis) receive frequent mention as
incentives for employers to reduce turnover.
Recognition of the prevalence of durable associations between
employers and their workers has 1ed to a treatment of the short run 1abor
adjustment that is, in many respects, similar to the analysis of the
employment of capital in the short run. (Baily (1974) and Azariadis are
well -known exampl es.) The employer selects a stock of workers of the
optimal size and a strategy for meeting any variation in demand that may
occur over the planning horizon. This strategy may include variation in
the wage and in the rate of utilization of the labor stock, but changes in
the stock itself are presumed to be prohibitively costly. Under these
conditions, optimal adjustments in utllization are made independently of
adjustments in the wage. Straightforward assumptions about the val ue of
workers' time off the job and the risk preferences of employers and workers
imply that the optimal strategy will involve variation in utilization but
no variation in the wage. If the attachment between a firm and the typical5
employee survives several cyclical episodes, then an implication is that
although wage rigidity is to be expected, it has no influence on the
amplitude of cyclical variation in unemployment.~
Since wage rigidity is irrelevant from this perspective, the
strategy adopted for meeting variation in demand depends on the costs of
storage and maintaining flexibility in production. Even if the wage is
constant, variation in utilization causes variation in earnings that
employees will accept only if they receive a compensating premium over the
wage paid for employment that involves a constant earnings stream. Thus,
employers facing variation in product demand have an incentive to dampen
its impact on thei r employees. They may pursue this objective by smoothi ng
production through the carrying of inventories, by absorbing some of the
impact of production variations through the "hoarding" of labor during
off-peak periods, or by simply not meeting all demand variation.
The arrangements between firms and employees in the models of
Azariadis and Baily have been called contingent claims contracts, because
they specify in advance the wage and utilization paths for each set of
contingencies that might possibly develop over the planning horizon.
Skeptics argue that such contracts are not observed in blue-collar labor
markets because the cost of enforcement is too high. Workers must be able
to observe their employer's compliance with the terms of any agreement, and
under a contingent claims contract this would require that they monitor the
course of demand. Because this is extremely costly, contracts in which the
verification of compliance does not require both parties to obtain timely
market information independently will dominate contingent claims contracts
(Williamson, Wachter, and Harris; Calvo and Phelps). Hall and Lilien
contend that contracts in blue-collar labor markets do not require close6
monitoring of demand by workers. The agreements tie earnings to
utilization in such a manner that the employer's pursuit of profit
maximization also maximizes the employees' utility. Employees can detect
noncompliance by monitoring utilization, a task much less costly than
monitoring demand.
Under contracts of this type, the hourly wage assumes great
importance. Consequently, it responds slowly to changes in market
conditions, and this i nfl exibility contributes to variation in 1abor
util ization (al though the considerations enumerated above will al so be
important). Wage rigidity arises from the asymnetrical distrlbution of
information about market conditions and the presence of appropriable
quasi-rents attributable to the impediments to worker mobility. Employees
resist wage cuts because they have difficulty di stingui shing a genui ne
reduction in demand from an attempt by their employer to exploit his short
run monopsony power (Feldstein (1975); Williamson and Wachter; Klein,
Crawford, and Al chian). Reductions in either util ization or wages wi 11
reduce labor earnings, but hours and employment adjustments arouse less
suspicion because output reductions generally accompany util ization
reductions and ensure that the employer will receive less revenue after the
change. Awareness of workers' disincl ination to accept wage reductions
deters employers from raising wages to long run equilibrium levels during
periods of temporarily high demand.
Identifyi ng whi ch of the two types of contracts prevails in bl ue
collar manufacturing has important consequences for theoretical predictions
of the effect of unions on t~e response to demand variation. If contingent
claims contracts prevail, the possibility that unions have little or no
effect on employment variation cannot be dismissed. Under the alternative7
type of arrangement, the effect of unionism could be substantial. Because
the issue remains unresolved, the impl ications of introducing collective
bargaining into the analysis are explored from both perspectives in the
following subsection.
B. Unionism and the response to cyclical shifts
Possible sources of greater rigidity in union wages may affect
other dimensions of the response to demand variation, so they will be
discussed first. Since the topic has received considerable attention
el sewhere, the review here covers only the arguments that fit into the
contracting framework outlined above. This restriction limits
consideration to two channels of influence--the possibility that union
members remain with their employers longer and the possibility that unions
raise the cost of temporary wage adjustments. The discussions by Dunlop,
Mitchell, and Moore and Raisian list some other potential contributors to
union wage rigidity.
Several students of collective bargaining have mentioned reasons
for expecting a positive association between unionism and the strength of
the empl oyer-employee attachment. Uni on wages are generally hi gher than
nonuni on wages, and wages and turnover are negatively related (Parsons).
Nonwage considerations such as seniority systems (Rees (1959)) and
grievance systems (Freeman) may also reduce turnover in union plants, and
Lewis (1959) suggested that workers in occupations in which the typical
employer-employee relationship is more durable will find the services of
uni on 1eaders more val uable. Freeman's evidence that uni on members, on
average, have accumulated more seniority on their current jobs than
nonunion workers is consistent with these propositions.8
This difference in ~obility may cause employers in the two
envi ronments to view cycl ical activi ty from di fferent perspectives. The
relative immobil ity of uni on workers may lead thei r employers to regard
cyclical shifts as short-run disturbances that do not warrant adjustment in
wages or labor stocks. Nonunion employers would be less likely to adopt a
perspective in which cycl ical activity is regarded as such a short run
phenomenon, so their adjustment of their 1abor stocks wi 11 exert pressure
on wages. The literature on uni on wage behavior does not often cite
immobility as a cause of union wage rigidity, however. Ounlop may have had
somethi ng of this nature in mi nd when he wrote (page 68), "The basic wage
rate is regarded as a long-run price, usually set with an eye to
noncycl ical circumstances," although his statement precedes the emergence
of the modern layoff models by decades. More recently, Raisian appears to
be using this line of reasoning in explaining the results of his
economy-wide comparisons of the cycl lcal behavior of union and nonunion
1abor markets.
The effect of collective bargaining on adjustment costs has been
mentioned much more often as a source of union wage rigidity. Unionism may
repress wage variation by reducing the frequency wi th which wages are ad-
justed and by reduci ng the amount by whi ch wages are changed when adjust-
ment does occur. Strikes occur most often during contract negotiations,
and the desire to avoid the costs of such interruptions provides an incen-
tive to renegotiate contracts less frequently (Mitchell). Union wage
i nsensitivity foll ows di rectly, for the importance of temporary conditions
can be expected to decline as the period over \'Ihich the terms of the con-
tracts are held constant increases (Rees (1951)). The possibili ty that9
organized workers may be able to resist wage cuts more effectively than un-
organized workers has also been raised (Dunlop; i,iorton). If this is so,
unionized employers will be less able to reduce wages in periods of tempo-
rarily low demand and, consequently, less willing to raise them in periods
of temporarily high demand.
~rguments similar to those raised in the discussion of wage flex-
ibility imply that adjustments in utilization are likely to be greater
under collective bargaining. In the case in which contracts tie
utilization and earnings, larger adjustments in hours and employment by
employers of union labor follow directly from the higher costs of adjusting
union wages. The ability of unions to raise wages provides another reason
for expecting larger utilization adjustments in union plants, even under
contingent claims contracting. The wage premium paid by union employers
shoul d enable them to rai se their hiri ng standards and mai ntain greater
variability in their production schedules relatively cheaply.
Unionism may al so influence the division of adjustments in the
labor input between changes in employment and changes in hours per worker.
The relative strength of employees I preferences for stability in weekly
hours versus continuity of employment will infl uence the relative costs of
adjusting hours and employment through the terms of the employment con-
tract. Because uni on contracts, whi ch can be observed easily, commonly
restrict the employer's freedom to impose worksharing or overtime, the
temptation exists to conclude the strength of union members' relative
preferences for hours stability exceeds that of nonunion workers. Avoiding
extreme hours reductions through 1ayoffs is a practice common among both
nonunion and union employers, however. Futhermore, Baily (1976) has noted10
that layoffs prevailed over worksharing even before many workers were
covered by unemployment insurance or collective bargaining contracts.
Thus, no compelling reason to expect the preferences of union and nonunion
workers to differ is apparent, although the wishes of union workers May be
observed more strictly if the terms of expl icit uni on contracts are more
effectively enforced.
The principal avenue through which unionism is likely to reduce the
cost of 1ayoffs is its effect on the probabil i ty that a 1ayoff wi 11 cause
an employee to change jobs.}j Although most layoff models ignore this
consideration (Baily (1976) is an exception), the rehire rate varies
considerably across industries (see Lilien), and the recall probability is
likely to vary substantially during recessions, when layoff duration
arises. All of the influences on employee mobility mentioned earlier
should cause the recall probability of union members to decay relatively
slowly as the length of the layoff increases, so cyclical employment
adjustments shoul d contribute less to turnover in uni on establi shments.
Unless these employers face greater hiring and training costs, this factor
should make union employers less reluctant to lay employees off.
II. A description of the empirical approach
The empirical analysis in this paper compares changes in wages
and uti1ization of uni on and nonuni on workers in manufacturing over the
1973-75 recession. The period was an interesting one, for it contained
shifts in the demand for labor resulting in large reductions in labor
utilization, particularly in manufacturing. Table 1 documents the increase11
in unemployment among manufacturing workers due to employer-initiated
separations. In addition to the rise in unemployment, the rate of growth
in consumer prices accelerated sharply. In the year preceeding May of
1973, the CPI increased 6 percent. In the two subsequent 12-month periods,
the index rose 10 percent and 9 percent, respectively.
The primary data for the investigation are from the Current
Population Surveys (CPS) conducted in ~ay of 1973, 1974, and 1975. The May
CPS interview has several advantages for comparison of the behavior of
union and nonunion sectors and for examination of cyclical labor market
behavior in general. The files identify union members and hourly produc-
tion workers, and they reveal the hourly wage and employment status of the
people surveyed. Analysis of adjustments in hours worked is facilitated by
information on "normal" weekly hours as well as hours actually worked in
the survey week. The large sample with considerable industry detail is
also helpful.
A. Previous empirical work
Al though theory indicates that union wages should exhibit less
sensitivi ty to cycl i cal demand shifts than nonuni on wages, the evidence,
particularly with respect to manufacturing wages, is mixed. In an
economy-wide study using aggregate wage series from 1920-1958, Lewis. (1963)
found the union wage premium sensitive to changes in inflation but
insensitive to unemployment. Ashenfelter, JOhnson, and Pencavel analyzed
wage behavior over the period 1954-1968 for two-digit manufacturing
industries. In a Phillips equation that included interactions of a union
coverage measure with inflation and unemployment variables, they found that
wages in heavily covered industries displayed a significantly smaller12
response to botl1 cyc1ica1 indicators. Pi erson, on tile otl1er l1and, ran
separate Phillips equations for lightly and heavily organized manufacturing
industries and found larger responses in the heavily organized sector.
Although there have been other aggregate studies (see the survey by
Moore and Raisian), the recent work has used micro data. Raisian, in an
economy-wide analysis of the period 1967-1974, found union wages less sen-
sitive to unemployment than nonunion wages. But in a similar study, Moore
and Raisian found little difference with respect to union status when they
restricted the sample to manufacturing workers. Mitchell, in an analysis
of wage data from i ndi vidual manufacturi ng establi shments, found evidence
of union wage rigidity with respect to both inflation and unemployment.
Recent research has produced evidenee consistent wi th the hypothe-
sis that the employment of union workers is more susceptible to interrup-
tion by layoff than the employment of nonunion workers. Feldstein (1978)
found union members l1ad a higher layoff unemployment rate in March of 1971,
which was a recession year. Medoff obtained a positive coefficient for
union coverage in a model analyzing variation in average layoff rates
across state by industry cells. Rai sian found the relationship between
changes in annual weeks worked and changes in industry unemployment rates
over the 1967-1974 period to be stronger for union members than for other
workers. Feldstein and Raisian used microdata that distinguished union
~
from nonunion workers, and their samples included workers from all
industries.
industries.
Medoff confined his analysis to layoffs in manufacturing
The interpretation of the existing evidence on the relationship
between unionism and the cyclical behavior of wages and employment contains13
some ambi guity. t~ost of this evidence consists of rel ationships between
union coverage and changes in wages or employment estimated from aggregate
data. Such models generally encounter particular difficulty in
distinguishing behavioral differences induced by collective bargaining from
differences attributab1 e to environmental characteristics associated with
uni oni sm. The use of aggregate unemployment to measure di fferences in
business conditions adds another weakness, for it does not capture
differences in demand changes across industries or occupations. Studies
that used micro data and did not rely on an aggregate unemployment rate,
such as those of Feldstein and Raisian, drew their evidence from samples
that contained workers from all sectors of the economy and procedures that
employed imprecise controls for differences across industries.
B. The data and method
The evidence in this paper is drawn from a sample in which
industry variab1 es from estab1ishment data have been merged with
observations on i ndividual workers in manufacturi ng from the CPS. The
sample contains only white male production workers who are paid by the
hour. The restriction of the sample should reduce differences in
unobserved attributes that differentiate union and nonunion workers, and
the industry variables should capture some of the effects of differences in
organized and unorganized plants that would be ignored if the CPS
information was not supplemented. Although the possibility cannot be
di smi ssed that any uni on-nonunion differences in the response to demand
variation implied by the resulti ng estimates arise from se1 ectivi ty or
omitted variable bias, the evidence here should contain less such
contamination than the results of previous work.14
The primary analytical tool is multiple regression, in which the
unit of observation is the individual worker. Three models are estimated;
their dependent variables reflect the individual's wage rate, hours worked,
and employment status in the May reference week for the CPS of the relevant
year. The right side of the equations contain individual characteristics
from the CPS record and industry variabl es attached to the CPS record.
Because the principal source of differences in the sensitivities of
employees' earnings to the business cycle is likely to be the cyclical
volatility of the employer's demand, the discussion of the regressions
focuses on the coefficients of a variable intended to capture variance in
demand conditions across industries and over time. Its value is the
difference between Eit, the log of employment for industry i in May of year
t, and a forecast of Eit based on the trend in industry employment over the
7 1/2-year period endi ng in May of year t-1. The CPS industry code is
sufficiently detailed to identify 73 industries within manufacturing to
which employment series from the BLS Employment and Earnings publication
could be matched.
Higher values of this prediction error correspond to higher
levels of residual employment, from which greater excess demand is
inferred. The variable is thus expected to be positively related to wages
and utilization. The models are of the form
y =alP + a2D(U}P + bX,
where P is the prediction error, D(U) is the union membership dummy, X is a
vector of other variables, and a and b are coefficient vectors. al is the
re1 ationshi p between the prediction error and the dependent variabl e for
nonunion workers; a2, the interaction coefficient, indicates the difference
between the estimates for union and nonuni on workers, and al+a2 is the15
relationship between the prediction error and the dependent variable for
union members. The union wage rigidity hypothesis implies a negative
interaction coefficient in the wage equation, and the hypothesis that
utilization is more sensitive in the union sector than the nonunion sector
anticipates al and aZ will have the same signs in the employment and hours
models.
The use of employment series to construct the measure of demand
shifts raises some econometric issues. One problem is that the prediction
error may contain some of the response that its coefficient is intended to
measure. Since hours adjustment is a substitute for employment adjustment,
groups that have more flexible hours will tend to have smaller fluctuations
in employment, so the estimate of the hours response will be biased toward
zero. The estimated wage response will contain a similar bias if adjust-
ments in wages and utilization are substitutes. The use of the employment-
based variable assumes that variance in the magnitude of shifts in the
demand for labor is very large relative to the variance in the response to
such shifts.
Another problem arises in the employment status regressions, in
whi ch the dependent variabl e indicates whether the individual was worki ng
during the survey reference week. Incl udi n9 the prediction error for i n-
dustry employment among the explanatory variables of such an equation
amounts to putting variants of the same concept on both sides of the equal
sign, so the response estimate is likely to contain serious bias. Interest
in this paper centers on the distribution of changes in unemployment rather
than their magnitude, however. Thus, only the relationshi p between the
responses of union and nonunion unemployment is important. The regressions16
contai ni ng the prediction error are not 1ikely to indicate a significant
difference in these responses if they are in fact equal, so the variable is
adequate for this limited purpose.
C. SPecific models and descriptive statistics
Section III discusses regression analysis of the behavior of real
wages. The log of the straight-time hourly wage, deflated by the Consumer
Price Index, is the dependent variable. The model assumes that human
capital accumulation as well as industry and area characteristics determine
the long-run equilibrium wage for each individual. Short-run conditions,
captured by the prediction error, cause departures from long-run val ues.
Each industry is described by the amount of value added per establishment,
union coverage, and the volatility of employment.!! The last variable is
approximated by the sum of squared residuals from a quadratic trend
regression of the log of industry employment over the years 1958-1975.
Section IV discusses two regressions, one for employment status and the
other for hours worked. Both use a qualitative dependent variable with
val ues ranging from one to three. The estimates reported are partial
derivatives obtained from maximum likelihood estimation of conditional
logit model s.
The discussion in the previous section emphasized short-run
employment adjustments via temporary layoffs and rehires, so examination of
the cycl i cal behavior of temporary 1ayoff unemployment is the princi pal
element of the empirical analysis of employment variation. Focusing on
layoff unemployment alone, however, would be misleading. As Table 1
illustrates, year-to-year variation in unemployment due to permanent
di scharges was 1arger in the nonuni on sector than in the uni on sector.17
This difference probably reflects the joint influences of the types of
employers that become unionized and the constraints introduced by unions.
The adjustment of employment through 1ayoffs and rehires. rather than
through discharges and new hires, is a practice generally associated with
larger enterprises. which have self-contained "internal labor markets," and
most of these employers are unionized. (See Wachter and Williamson and the
references therein.) In addition. union contracts may make permanent
dismissals more costly in order to protect the gains union workers achieve
through collective bargaining.
The pattern in Table 1 raises the point that the larger rise in
union layoff unemployment might reflect a substitution of layoffs for dis-
charges. with little difference in the overall employment adjustment in the
two sectors. To investigate this possibility. the dependent variable in
the employment status model. which compares the employed with the unem-
ployed. distinguishes people who expect recall from those who do not.
Those unemployed via voluntary separation and those employed but not work-
ing for reasons other than layoff were excluded from the sample. The model
contains the value added per establishment variable and a union membership
dummy to control for the effects of employer size and collective bargaining
on the layoff-discharge decision.
The dependent variable in the hours adjustment model is somewhat
unusual. Table 2 describes the distribution of a variable designated
"excess hours," which is the difference between actual and normal weekly
hours expressed as a percentage of normal hours. The stabili ty across
years exhibited by the means of the positive and negative val ues of this
variable is remarkable. Presumably. it reflects the presence of upper and18
lower boLinds on hours worked impl i ed by model s such as Baily's (1977).
This property complicates the analysis, for a regression using excess hours
as the dependent variabl e yields prediction error coefficients wi th the
wrong signs. The table indicates that most year-to-year variation in the
variable arises from variation in the proportions of people working more or
fewer hours than normal. Therefore, the hours adjustment model reported in
Section IV uses a qualitative dependent variable whose value is determined
by the sign of excess hours.
Table 3 contains some statistics indicating how the industry
measures vary across CPS industry groups. The prediction errors show a
_very large decline in residual employment over the period. Employment was
above the level predicted from past trends by an average of 13.5 percent in
:4ay of 1973, but by 1975 it had fallen to 11 percent below trend. A com-
parison of the means of the shift and volatility measures in the durable
and nondurable sectors indicates that employment has been more stable in
nondurables by a factor of about three. Establishments in nondurables are
also slightly smaller and less heavily unionized.
Table 4 shows the distributions of the industry variables after
their attachment to the records of the CPS. The unit of observation here
is the individual worker. The means of the shift measures for union and
nonunion workers reveal that the concentrations of workers in industries
that experienced large reductions in employment were about the same for
both uni on members and nonuni on employees. Thus, any union-nonunion dif-
ferences in utilization adjustments are not so likely to be a consequence
of greater union penetration in the more volatile durable goods sector.
The table does indicate a marked difference in the concentrations of the
two types of workers in industries characterized by large plants, however.19
III. Adjustments in Wage Rates
The wage equations discussed in this section contain a mixture of
standard and less common variables. In addition to the industry measures
described earlier, the equations i ncl ude age and its square, years of
schooling, and sets of dummies capturing variance attributable to
differences in marital and union status, area population density, region,
occupation, and state laws regarding the establishment of the union shop.2!
The industry variables and the right-to-work dummy are interacted wit.'1 the
union membership dummy. Table A-l, appended, contains the coefficients of
the variables that are not of primary concern in this paper. Space does
not permit a thorough discussion of these estimates, but a few are of suf-
ficient interest to note briefly.
The positive coefficients for the union coverage variable and its
interaction with the union membership dummy indicate that wages of both
union and nonunion workers are higher in the more heavily organized indus-
tries and that the union-nonunion wage differential is a positive function
of coverage. These relationships are consistent with conventional wisdom,
whi ch hol ds that uni on power is positively related to coverage and that
unioni sm raises nonunion wages through threat or spillover effects. Other
factors could explain the coefficients, but the issue will not be pursued
further here. The right-to-work and establishment size coefficients
indicate nonunion wages are higher in larger establishments and in states
that allow the union shop, but union wages appear to be almost independent
of these variables. Although this, too, has more than one possible
explanation, the threat effect investigated by Rosen (1969) is an
attractive candidate. Union coverage is higher in union shop states and20
industries characterized by large plants. Therefore, the estimates suggest
that nonunion employers in greater jeopardy of being organized pay higher
wages than other nonunion employers in order to reduce the appeal of
unionism.
Table 5 displays the coefficients of variables included to
capture the effects of cyclical activity. Three specifications were esti-
mated to investigate the sources of year-to-year wage variation, which is
assumed to arise solely from the combined effects of productivi ty trends
and the rises in unemployment and inflation. The union wage rigidity
hypothesis implies that the rise in unemplo~nent should have reduced growth
in nonunion wages relative to growth in union wages, but the rise in
inflation should have at least partially offset that reduction. Therefore,
the net change in the union-nonunion differential cannot be predicted. The
estimates in column 1 measure the net changes in union and nonunion wages,
and the estimates in column 2 isolate the component of the change
attributable to the rise in unemployment. The specification in the third
col urnn assumes all between-year variance in real wages was due to this
factor; it is included simply to examine the performance of the prediction
error variable.
Looking first at the bottom three rows of coefficients, the
estimates offer no evidence that historic emplo~ent variability influences
long-run wage levels. The estimated elasticities with respect to the
measure of stochastic employment variability are small and positive for
nonunion workers and small and negative for union workers. In only one
case is an estimate larger than its standard error. This finding is
curious, because authors developing layoff models have emphasized the
proposition that employers having reputations for extensive variation in21
1abor uti1ization must pay hi gher wages to attract workers. T~e small
elasticities may be a consequence of the reduction of variance in risk
though unemployment insurance, misspecification of the model, an
inappropriate measure of unemployment risk, or the restriction of the
sample to manufacturing workers. Consequently, the estimates do not
necessarily indicate that the proposition does not hold.§!
The attempt to measure short-run responses in real wages was more
successful. The specification reported in the first column contains a set
of year dummy variables and the interaction of this set with the union
membership dummy. This permits estimation of separate intercepts for the
union and nonunion wage functions in each year. The 1974 and 1975 dummy
coefficients indicate that the intercept of the nonunion wage function
shifted downward about 4.5 percent in the ~NO years following May 1973.
The coefficients of the interaction variables (O(1973)xO(Ul, et cetera)
allow the inference of a separate union-nonunion wage differential in each
year. The coefficient estimates imply this differential rose almost 3
percentage points over the period, so the downward shift in the union wage
function was less than 2 percent.
The specification reported in column 2 adds the industry
employment prediction error and its interaction with the union membership
dummy to capture the effect of the shifts in industry demand. The
prediction error coefficient is positive and significant, implying
procyclic variation in the real wages of nonunion workers. The interaction
coefficient is negative, indicating that the shifts had a smaller impact on
the real wages of union members. The sum of these ~o coefficients,22
labeled "a1+a2" in the table, suggests slight procyclic variation in union
real wages. The third column reports the estimates from an equation
containing the prediction error variables without the year dummies. The
pattern of the coefficients is similar to that of column 2.
The addition of the prediction errors has a striking effect on
the year dummy coefficients. The estimates indicate that nonunion wages,
once they have been adjusted for the effects of the demand shift, did not
change in the first year and rose about 3 percent in the second year.
Accordingly, the rising pattern exhibited by the year-union interaction
coefficients in the first column reverses. The estimates in column 2
imply that the union-nonunion wage differential would have declined 3.5
percentage points over the period if industry demand had not fallen, and
the influences of trend and rising inflation would have held union real
wages essentially constant.
The precise magnitudes of the estimates of the separate influ-
ences of inflation and unemployment cannot be regarded with a great deal of
confidence, because the estimates are probably sensitive to the choice of
procedure used to forecast industry employment, Eit. Nevertheless, the
general character of the results is consistent with the hypothesis that
nominal union wages are less sensitive to short-run disturbances than
nominal wages of nonunion workers. The response of nonunion wages to
industry demand shifts is admittedly small, but it is highly significant,
and the response of union wages to these shifts is a fraction of the non-
union response. Furthermore, if the trends in union and nonunion wages can
be assumed to be identical, then the pattern of the year dummy coefficients
in column 2 indicates that the rise in the growth of consumer prices in the23
year following May of 1973 had a larger and more persistent effect on real
union wages than real nonunion wages. This suggests that nominal union
wages responded more slowly to unforeseen changes in inflation than nominal
wages of nonunion workers.
In their paper usi ng a similar approach to capture the effect of
cyclical shifts on wage rates. Smith and Welch note that if the employment
residual s do in fact capture cycl es incross section, then the qualltative
characteristics of the estimates from the pooled sample should be retained
when the model is estimated over individual year cross sections. The
results of this exercise, presented in Table 6, are encouraging. Procyclic
variation in the wages of both union and nonunion workers is observed in
all three years, and the interaction coefficient is negative in each case.
Thus, the prediction error does appear to be a moderately consistent
measure of cyclical activity even in single-year cross sections.Z!
IV. Employment and hours adjustments
The logit models reported in this section contain fewer explana-
tory variables than the wage regressions. The equations here include age
and its square, years of schooling, value added per establishment, dummies
for union membership and occupation, and the industry employment prediction
error and its interaction with the uni on dummy. The model s al so contain a
1agged prediction error--the average of the forecast errors for
December through r~ay of year t-l. This variable was added to capture the
effect of changes in the stocks of employees that may have occurred in the
recent past. Current utilization should be negatively related to past
adjustments. For example, an exceptionally large amount of hiring in year24
t-1 should lead to a smaller fraction of employees working overtime and a
larger fraction of employees on layoff in year t.
Tables 7 and 8 show estimated derivatives dPi/dXj-- where Pi is
the probability of observing an individual in state i and Xj is independent
variable j--for i=l (on layoff in Table 7 and working overtime in Table 8),
i=2 (unemployed via discharge in Table 7 and working fewer hours than nor-
mal in Table 8) and all j. In the employment status model, the estimates
are used to compare the employed with the unemployed and al so to compare
those who expect recall with those who must find new jobs. In the hours
adjustment model, the derivatives identify some of the characteristics
associated with variation in the workweek and also captures any asymmetries
in hours variation. Derivatives in a logit model are functions of the
val ues of the probabilities, and the derivatives in the tables here were
computed using values of Pi obtained by evaluating the logit functions.
Sample means were used for all independent variables except the prediction
errors, which were set to zero to simulate a steady-state. The values of
these probabi1ities are 1i sted at the bottom of each table. The Appendi x
contains the logit coefficient estimates and an outl ine of the procedure
for computing logit derivatives.
A. Employment status results
The negative contemporaneous prediction error derivatives in
Table 7 reflect the negative association between levels of residual
employment and rates of industry unemployment. The absolute values
of the derivatives indicate how a small reduction in residual employment
waul d be distributed between uni on and nonuni on unemployment and between
layoffs and discharges. The negative interaction derivative for layoffs25
reveal s that layoffs of union workers account for more of the reduction in
residual employment than do layoffs of nonunion workers. The trivial
interaction derivative in the discharge column indicates that a decline in
residual employment contributes equally to discharge unemployment in the
union and nonunion sectors. A comparison of the derivatives across
equations shows that deviations from trend cause larger changes in layoff
unemployment than di scharge unemployment among both uni on and nonuni on
workers. These fi ndi ngs are generally consistent with expectations based
on the considerations covered in Section 1. Layoffs dominate cyclical
employment variation,~ and layoff unemployment among union members is more
sensitive to between-year shifts in employment than nonunion layoff
unemployment. The princi pal surprise it is the rather 1arge contribution
of discharges to cyclical variation in unemployment among union members.
Most of the remaining derivatives are al so consistent with the
previous di scussion. The adjustment in the current year is negatively
related to residual employment in the previous year. The layoff-discharge
rati0 is a positive function of establishment size, union membershi p, and
school ing.'y The schooli ng effect may reflect the positive correlation
between levels of general and specific skills outlined by 01. Older
workers and those higher in the occupational hierarchy are less 1ikely to
be disemployed, but these factors have no effect on the layoff-discharge
ratio.101 The trivial relationship between schooling and layoff
unemployment was unexpected, but it may be a consequence of the sample's
homogeneity.26
B. Hours adjustment results
In the hours adjustment estimates in Table 3, the signs of the
contemporaneous prediction error derivatives reflect the positive relation-
ship between residual employment and hours worked per week. The magnitudes
of these derivatives indi cate the size of changes in the percentages of
employees working more and fewer hours than normal that accompany a I-unit
deviation of employment from trend. The union-prediction error interaction
derivative in each column has the same sign as the contemporaneous
prediction error derivative in that column, so employment deviations are
associated wi th adjustments in hours worked for a 1arger percentage of
employed union workers. This is true for decreases in hours worked as well
as increases. Comparing derivatives across columns indicates that cyclical
variation in the percentage of employees working overtime is 'lluch larger
than cyclical variation in the percentage of employees working fewer hours
than usual. Although this could have been anticipated from the figures in
Table 2, the result is still somewhat surprising in view of the premium
required for overtime.
The remaining estimates in the hours adjustment model also reveal
some interesting information. Most notable is the negative relationship
between hours in the current period and residual employment in previous
periods; the influence runs in the anticipated direction, but it is unex-
pectedly strong. The asymmetric relationships between age, occupation, and
hours adjustments are al so curious; older workers and craftsmen are less
1ikely to experience hours reductions, but the frequency of overtime work
is apparently independent of these variables. The school ing derivatives
suggest that workers with more skill are less likely to have their workweek27
shortened and more likely to work overtime, although the estimates for
these variables could also indicate that skilled workers underreport
"normal" weekly hours. The percentage of workers experiencing any
adjustment in the workweek, either upward or downward, declines as
establishment size increases. This may reflect limitations in the
flexibility of operating large assembly lines, or it may arise from the
more bureaucratic lines of authority in large plants.
C. Summary
The two logit model s indicate that adjustments in labor stocks
are an important component of manufacturers' strategies for meeting
year-to-year variation in demand. Discharges contributed significantly to
the 1973-75 rise in manufacturi ng unemployment. and the 1agged prediction
error deri vatives reveal a signi ficant rel ationship between adjustments in
labor stocks in year t-1 and adjustments in utilization in year t.
Comparisons of the union and nonunion derivatives in Tables 7 and
B provide limited support for the hypothesis that the smaller adjustments
in the wages of union workers led to larger adjustments in their
utilization. Both 1ayoff unemployment and overtime rates among union
workers were more responsive to the forces that produced, the 1973-75
declines in residual employment in manufacturing industries. The
comparisons reveal an incongruity, however. The union-nonunion differences
in the changes in wages and hours were very large, while the employment
adjustments in the two sectors were somewhat similar. The adjustment costs
theory of wage rigidity does not indicate how much employment stability a
9iven increase in wage fl exibility buys, but the estimates in Tabl e 7
suggest it is not much. Whether this is a sign that the stability of wages28
and utilization are not substitutes over cyc1es--or an indication that the
tradeoff is between variation in wages and hours--cannot be detennined.
Nevertheless, the results suggest that adjustment costs are important
detenninants of cyclical hours variation.
V. Concluding remarks
The results of this analysis of the 1973-1975 period illustrate
the features that have domi nated most di scussions of cycl ical 1abor market
behavior. Nominal wage growth was stable, even in the face of large
changes in inflation and unemployment, and there is little evidence that
employers adopted worksharing arrangements to reduce layoffs. On the other
hand, the estimates suggest that the standard characterization can be
overdrawn. Wage adjustments did occur, and on average they were larger ;n
the industries facing larger employment adjustments. Furthennore, the
workweek showed flexibility in the upward direction during the period of
extremely high labor force utilization, and that flexibility dampened the
subsequent employment adjustment when utilization fell sharply.
The data revealed two exceptions to conventional wisdom. The
first is that hours adjustments appear to be more frequent and 1arger than
is commonly bel ieved to be the case. Tabl e 2 shOWS that the small and
stable mean for excess hours conceal s considerable hours variation for in-
dividual workers. About 30 percent of manufacturing employees were not at
work the usual number of hours duri ng the May survey weeks in each of the
three years, and the average departure from the nonn was not trivial. A
great deal of this variation is not cyc1 ical, and the high proportion of
employees worki ng overtime in May 1975, when unemployment was near 9 per-29
cent, suggests seasonal factors and random fl uctuations may be sources of
hours adjustments equal in importance to cyclical activity.
The data al so are i nconsistent wi th the popul ar notion that re-
ductions in nomi nal wage growth are achieved 1ess easily than increases.
A lthough the Ni xon price control program may have restricted the response
of wages to demand increases early in the period, the relationships between
residual employment and wages are stronger for later years when employment
in most of the industries was below trend. The rather weak response to the
1974 jump in the price level al so undermines support for the proposition
that the flexibility of wage growth is asymmetrical.
The results indicate that close examination of disaggregated data
can reveal much about cycl ical behavior of the labor market and about the
role of labor unions. Conclusions about cyclical behavior from the
evidence here must be tentative, because the data cover only the
contraction phase of one business cycle. Two additional issues that could
be approached along these lines are differences across industries in lags
in wage responses to a change 1n the inflation trend and the effects of the
aggregate economic conditions on an employer's response to industry demand
shifts. Both issues were ignored in the preceeding analysis, but they
could be readily incorporated in an analysis of similar data covering a
longer period. Factors other than uni oni sm probably affect wage flexibil-
ity, and an employer's response to a change 1n demand can be expected to
depend on whether the employers in other industries are experiencing simi-
1ar conditions. Wi th regard to uni on-nonunion differences, the degree to
which one will find the paper's evidence persuasive will depend on his
evaluation of the analytical method. The approach has weaknesses--30
potentially important wi thin-industry variance is not captured--but
evidence from which concl usions can be drawn more confidently requires
detailed data on the behavior of individual employers. The estimates
indicate that such data, if available, would show unionism has a pronounced
effect on the response to demand variation.31
FOOTNOTES
1. "Wage rigidity" refers to the situation in which changes in wages are
"in the right direction but too small to make actual wages equal to
their equilibrium counterparts," (Lewis (1963), p. 213).
2. Hall suggests that the wage rate might be viewed as an instalment
payment to the employee when workers typically remain with one
emp1oyer for a "long" period (on the order of ten years).
3. "Layoff" here refers to an employer-initiated separation that is tem-
porary ex ante--the employer will attempt to recall the employee
eventually, but he is free to seek another permanent job in the
meanwhile. Employer-initiated separations that the employer intends
to be permanent from the outset wlll be called "discharges." The BLS
refers to workers in either situation as "job losers."
4. The value added variable, included to capture the effect of
estab1 ishment size, was taken from the 1972 Census of Manufacturers.
It was merged with the CPS data on a geographlc (9 Census dlvlSlons)
as well as industry basis. The union coverage rates, which refer to
white, full-time production workers, were computed from the May CPS
files for 1973-1976. The volatility measure was computed from
Employment and Earnings data.
5. If the respondent did not reside in one of the most populous states,
the geographic information in the CPS placed him in a state group
rather than an individual state. If the group contained both
right-to-work and other states, then the value assigned the
right-to-work variab1e is the probabi1 ity he lived ina right-to-work
state, based on his twO-digit industry.
6. Abowd and Ashenfelter have investigated this issue more thoroughly.
They do find evidence of a wage premium for employment in jobs with
anticipated layoff unemployment.
7. Si ng1 e year cross-sections provide an attractive alternative to the
conventiona1 time series procedures for analyzi ng the impact of wage
controls. In addition to affecting econo~-wide average wages,
controlseould dampen the response to short run movements in demand.
Applying this reasoning to the results in Table 6, where the power of
the prediction error is smaller in 1973 than in 1975, is tempting,
because the 1973 wages may have been influenced by the final phases of
the Nixon price control program. But the lack of data covering the
period before and during the Nixon controls makes any inferences using
this approach high1y suspect.32
8. lil ien found unemployment among job changers contributes more to
increases in manufacturing unemployment during recessions than
temporary 1ayoffs, but he defines temporary 1ayoffs as those
separations that actually end in recall, whereas here a separation is
considered to be temporary If the employee anticipates recall.
9. The significance of the union dummy is considerably higher when the
establishment size variable is omitten.
10. Although one might anticipate that seniority would offer a union
worker more protection than a nonunion worker, the data do not support
that hypothesis. Addi tion of interactions of age and its square wi th
the union dummy increased the overall chi square statistic by 2.1,
which is insignificant at the 10 percent confidence level."Anticipated Unemployment,
Wage Di fferential s." NBER
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LAYOFF AND OISCHARGE UNEMPLOYMENT IN MANUFACTURING











Notes: Population restricted to hourly white male production workers who
were either employed or job losers.
SOURCE: May Current Population Surveys.TABLE 2
EXCESS HOURS IN MANUFACTURING
Standard Percent Mean of Percent Mean of
Mean Deviation Positive Positives Negative Negatives
Nonunion
1973 1.51 14.1 23.0 18.7 13.2 -21.1
1974 O.lB 14.2 19.4 17.4 13.5 -23.7























lIotes: All figures are percentages. Population restricted to white male
hourly production workers.
SOURCES: May Current Population Surveys.TABLE 3
STATISTICS ON INDUSTRY VARIABLES
A. ALL MANUFACTURING (73 INDUSTRIES)
Standard Number Mean of Mean of
Mean Deviation Minimum Maximum Positive Positives Negatives
Prediction Errors;
1973 .135 .125 -.075 .612 68 .149 -.048
1974 .070 .117 -.449 .464 59 .100 -.056
1975 - .111 .111 -.345 .194 11 .069 -.143
Index of Stochastic
Employment Vari-
abil ity .660 .882 .012 5.30
Val ue Added per
~stablishment (HOM) .264 .421 .001 3.99






Durables (38 Industries) Nondurables (35 Industries)
Standard Standard
Mean Deviation Mean Deviation
.194 .135 .072 .074
.092 .148 .047 .064



















SOURCES; Employment and Earnings
Census of Manufacturers
May Current populatlon SurveysTABLE 4
STATISTICS ON INDUSTRY VARIABLES AFTER ATTACHMENT TO CPS RECORDS
Standard Percent Mean of r~ean of
Mean Deviation Positive Positives Negatives
A. NONUNION WORKERS
Prediction Errors:
1973 .16~ .129 95 .176 -.052
1974 .071 .114 78 .106 -.056







Union Coverage .484 .151
B. UNION WORKERS
Prediction Errors:
1973 .151 .122 95 .162 -.045
1974 .077 .105 78 .108 -.023







Union Coverage .613 .155
SOURCES: Employment and Earnings
Census of Manufacturers
May Current Population SurveysTABLE 5
ESTIMATES FROM WAGE EQUATIONS
POOLED SAMPLES FOR 1973-75
1 2 3
Prediction Error [a1] .269 .201
(7.71 (8.6)

















Index) [b1] .009 .004 .005
(2.3) (1.0) (1.3)
[Ln(Demand Variability
Index)]xD(U) [b2] -.014 -.01 -.012
(-2.9) (2.1l (2.4)
[bl + b2] -.005 -.007 -.007
(1.71 (2.2) (2.3)
R2 .3523 .3565 .3559
Standard Error of
Estimate .2384 .2376 .2377
Number of Observations: 9,596
Mean of Dependent Variable: 1.075
Notes: Absolute t-ratios in parentheses. Remaining coefficients in Table
A-l.
SOURCES: Employment and Earnings, Census of Manufacturers, and May Current
Population SurveysTABLE 6
ESTIMATES OF COEFFICIENTS OF
PREDICTION ERROR IN WAGE EQUATIONS:
SEPARATE SAMPLES FROM 1973-75
1973 1974 1975
Prediction Error [al] .328 .270 .449
(4.8) (4.3) (6.1l
(Prediction Error)xD(U) [a2] -.228 -.152 -.325
(2.4) (1.9) (3.5)
[al+a2] .100 .118 .124
(1.6) (2.2) (2.2)
R2 .3382 .3627 .3754
Partial R2 (both variables) .0073 .0079 .0133
Standard Error of
Estimate .2398 .2312 .2413
Mean of Dependent Variable 1.09 1.07 1.06
Humber of Observations 3292 3226 3078
Notes: Absolute t-ratios in parentheses:
These equations also contain the demand variability index and all
the variables listed in Table A-I.
SOURCES: Employment and Earnings
Census of Manufacturers
May Current Population SurveysTABLE 7






School ing -.011 -.100
(0.3) (3.1)






Lagged Prediction Error 1.54 1.57
(2.11 (2.1)
Contemporaneous
Prediction Error [a1] -6.63 -4.24
(8.0) (6.7)
(Contemporaneous Prediction
Error) x DlU) [aZ] -Z.46 -1.64
(2.4) (0.2)
[a1 + a2] -9.09 -4.41
(14.3) (6.2)
Steady State Probability .013 .012
Notes: Derivatives have been multiplied by 100.
VAE is value added per establishment.
Absolute t-ratios in parentheses.
SOURCES: See Table A-2.TABLE 8






















































Notes: Derivatives have been multiplied by 100.
VAE is value added per establishment.
Absolute t-ratios in parentheses.
SOURCES: See Table A-3.·/IPPENDIX
The multinomial logit model, introduced by Theil, is of the form
•
(1) (i =1, ••• , k-1),
where the dependent variable assumes integer values from 1 through k. X is
the vector of independent variables, Pi is the probability that the
dependent variable is equal to i, and the Bi are vectors of coefficients
with elements bij• The probabilities must sum to 1, so the individual Pi
and the independent variables are related by
where
1/(1/-lSm) if 1 = k
1
PkSi if i < k,
Si = exp (BiX ) {i = 1, •••, k-1l.
The derivative of Pi with respect to the jth independent variable
(denoted Pijl is then
Sample frequencies are commonly used for the probabil ities Pi' A set of
steady-state probabilities is desired here, however, and these can be•
•
A-2
obtained from equations (2) by assigning suitable values to the independent
variables and using the logit coefficients reported in Tables A-2 and A-3.
To approximate the steady-state, the prediction error variables are set to
o and the remaining variables are set to their means. The establishment
size mean is 0.62, the mean age is 38, and the mean years of school ing is
12.
The age derivative for both groups and the contemporaneous
prediction error derivative for union workers required computation of
linear combinations. The form depends on the value of age, and the
derivatives reported in Section IV are for a worker 38 years old. The
contemporaneous prediction error derivatives for union workers are computed
using the sums of the logit coefficients of this variable and the logit
coefficients of the interaction with the union dummy.TABLE A-I
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Notes: aThese are the coefficients of the remaining variables from the
regression reported in column 3 of Table 5. Absolute t-ratios in
parentheses.
bD(RTW) is a dummy whose value is 1 if the individual resides in a
state that outlaws the union shop.•
•
TABLE A-2














• Ln(VAE) .196 -.166
(4.0) (2.9) 26.0
Lagged Prediction Error 1.22 1.32
(2.1) (2.2) 8.7
Contemporaneous Predic-
tion Error -5.24 -3.60
(8.1) (6.8) 106.3
(Contemporaneous Predic-
tion Error)xD(U) -1.93 -.162
(2.4) (0.2) 5.7
Sample Proportions .026 .022
Number of Observations: 12,044
Overall Chi Square: 606.82
Notes: VAE is value added per establishment. Figures in parentheses are
absolute t-ratios•TABLE A-3





































































Number of Observations: 10,700
Overall Chi Square: 163.84
Notes: VAE is value added per establishment. Figures in parentheses are
absolute t-ratios.